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3.1  Introduction 
This paper examines the evolution of the measure and use of cost data in a 
medium-size chemical company in the American Midwest from 1890 to 1914. 
This was a period during which there was significant innovation in the tech- 
niques of  cost measurement.’ It was also a period of  experimentation on the 
part of  manufacturing firms in the design of their information systems.*  These 
changes reflected new demands arising from the growing size and complexity 
of firms. In the small, vertically disintegrated manufacturing firm common in 
the early part of the nineteenth century, the demand for the generation of for- 
mal measures of  internal firm activity was limited, first, by  the availability, 
through direct observation, of  virtually costless “informal” information, and, 
second, by the relatively restricted set of choices available to managers given 
the level of technological development. With the growth in the size of the firm 
and the increasing separation of  ownership from management, direct obser- 
vation of employees and production processes was more costly, if  not physi- 
cally impossible. With the introduction of new, mobile, and inanimate sources 
of power, firms had much more flexibility in their choice of location and pro- 
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1. See Chatfield (1977) and Garner (1976) for surveys of the introduction of new techniques in 
cost measurement and accounting. 
2. See, for example, Johnson (1975); Kistler, Carter, and Hinchey (1984); Loveday (1980); 
Lubar (1984); McGaw (1985); Tyson (1988); and Yates (1989). 
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duction meth~d.~  Vertical integration gave firms greater control over the mar- 
keting  of  their  products,  and  greater  responsibility for  setting  their  own 
 price^.^ These changes led to an increase in the demand for formal data collec- 
tion for use in firm management and decision making.5 
Managers, of course, did not simply haphazardly increase the quantity of 
data collected. These various decisions required different kinds of  informa- 
tion. Historically, there is a typical order to the introduction of new uses of 
formal information systems in  manufacturing firms.6 This order reflects in 
part the preexistence (i.e., the existing supply, as discussed in Yates, chap. 4 
in this volume) of certain information-gathering and aggregation techniques, 
in particular those developed over the previous several centuries by merchant 
firms, which I will refer to as “mercantile” accounting techniques. These tech- 
niques were appropriate to certain needs, particularly preventing and detect- 
ing fraud,  that manufacturing firms had  in  common with  their mercantile 
predecessors. This common order also reflects a similarity in the evolution of 
demands placed upon formal information systems during this period. 
In this paper I focus on the shift in demand for information associated with 
changes in firm strategy. The strategic shifts observed in this case study are 
fairly characteristic of  nineteenth-century “Chandlerian” firms. In the early 
years of our story the firm is small and single-product and markets its entire 
output through exclusive wholesale agents. Later it pursues a technologically 
innovative, multiproduct strategy that catapults the Dow Chemical Company 
into a large, modem, vertically integrated firm. By following the evolution of 
the firm’s information system over this period, we can observe the changes in 
the types and uses of information demanded as a result of this strategic shift.’ 
3. While technological change in the production of power is perhaps the most dramatic change 
observed during this period, many other innovations also presented firms with new choices. See, 
for example, McGaw’s (1985)  article describing the use of costing data in choosing between rags 
and wood in the production of paper. 
4. For example, Chandler’s (1977) description of the information system at the Lyman textile 
mills suggests that it was used to control waste of labor and materials. But, “these statistical data 
were not used in pricing or in making investment decisions. . . . Such decisions remained almost 
entirely with the firm’s selling agent” (247). Until the firm integrated forward and controlled its 
own sales, there was no managerial demand for cost data to inform pricing decisions. 
5. This presumes, of course, that there was an elastic supply of information-gathering tech- 
niques. See Yates (chap. 4 in this volume) for a discussion of the innovations in mechanical and 
managerial techniques of data collection and processing that gave rise to this elastic supply. 
6. For a more detailed chronology of  the changes in information systems during the nineteenth 
century, see Levenstein (1991, chap. 2). 
7. This assumes that the supply of information is perfectly elastic and itself stable, so that all 
observed changes trace out shifts in demand. Of course, neither of these assumptions is correct. 
As the Yates paper (chap. 4 in this volume) makes clear, there were exogenous shifts downward 
in the supply of information as a result of technological innovation. And despite these declines in 
costs, the collection and processing of information undoubtedly continued to display increasing 
marginal costs. This affected not only the quantity of data collected, but the type as well. In order 
to economize, firms would force data to do “double duty,” choosing to produce a measure that 
could be used for more than one purpose, even if it was not the optimal measure. 1 examine both 
how firms made these compromises and what the implications were for decisions taken. 73  The Use of Cost Measures 
3.2  The Functions and Forms of Information 
In the discussion that follows it will be useful to make distinctions as to 
both form and function in describing the data produced by a firm’s informa- 
tion system. Included in the “form” of data are features such as units of de- 
nomination (e.g., dollars, kilowatts, etc.), frequency of production, degree of 
aggregation, and whether estimated measures (e.g., standard costs, allocated 
overhead) are included. 
The functions of these data in a manufacturing firm can be divided into two 
categories: monitoring and planning (see fig.  3.1). The primary distinction 
between information used to monitor and that used in planning is the timeli- 
ness with which it must be produced. Information available only at the end of 
the period, that is, after a decision has been taken, is still helpful in monitor- 
ing. For information to be used in planning, the system that generates it must 
do so prior to the time when the decision is made. 
We  may further distinguish between two types of  monitoring: monitoring 
people and monitoring processes (fig. 3. 1).8  Monitoring a process, say to de- 
termine whether it is “in-control” or not, is, at least theoretically, a relatively 
straightforward statistical control problem. Monitoring people is a more com- 
plicated problem. In a typical principal-agent problem, the outcome reported 
by  the information system does not perfectly distinguish information about 
the state of  the world  from information about the effort and ability of the 
person monitored. However, the knowledge that one is being monitored influ- 
ences the behavior of the agent. Thus the form and content of the data gath- 
ered must be selected to both inform the principal and provide the appropriate 
incentives to the agent. 
Two different kinds of  accounting techniques are used to monitor people. 
Mercantile accounting procedures were developed, in  part,  to monitor the 
honesty of those entrusted with the principals’ in~estment.~  These techniques 
provide  information on transactions between the  firm and outsiders to the 
firm. During the late nineteenth century new  techniques were developed to 
inform the principal as to the effort and ability of an agent. Like those used to 
monitor processes, these techniques focused on activity internal to the firm. 
These techniques were sometimes, though not always, a part of a firm’s cost 
accounting system.  lo These techniques included such measures as time cards 
8. See Demski and Kreps (1982) and Baiman (1982) for further discussion of the different uses 
of information. 
9. See Littleton (1933) and ten Have (1976) for survey histories of accountancy. Greif (1989) 
gives an example of  another method developed by merchants to ensure the honesty of their agents 
when they could not easily be monitored. 
10. In chapter 2 in this volume, H. Thomas Johnson distinguishes between “cost accounting” 
systems, which produced measures of average total cost to be used as input into the firm’s financial 
accounts,  and “managerial  accounting,” which produced various measures,  possibly including 
cost of  product, in response to managerial  demands for information.  During the period under 
discussion, there was no general agreement as to whether cost and financial accounts should be 
integrated (see, e.g., Arnold 1899). Thus the line of demarkation is quite fuzzy. 74  Margaret Levenstein 
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Fig. 3.1  Functions of information in a manufacturing  firm 
and time clocks, which were introduced widely during this period."  Frequent 
reporting of cost, profitability, and other aggregate measures of  firm success 
was used to inform investors of managerial quality. 
The planning function can be broken down further into long- and short- 
term decision making. Short-term decisions include choosing output levels of 
goods already in the firm's product line, choosing inputs to production, in- 
cluding make or buy decisions that do not involve a large fixed capital invest- 
ment, making minor modifications to an existing production process, and so 
11. An early example is Metcalfe (1885). See Jacoby (1985) for a discussion of the introduction 
12. While the calculation of profits was not an invention of the late nineteenth century, periodic 
of labor-monitoring techniques in this period. 
reporting was (see Previts and Merino 1979). 75  The Use of Cost Measures 
forth.  Many short-term decisions are made repeatedly (e.g., deciding how 
much to produce each month). Thus the data necessary to inform these deci- 
sions are produced regularly, and the decision rule (the decision as a function 
of the reported data) can be made routine. 
The most important aspect of long-term planning is the making of capital 
allocation decisions. In a multiproduct firm, comparative measures of profit- 
ability may be used to allocate capital among different product lines. How- 
ever, because the investment decision is inherently prospective, and data pro- 
duced by a firm’s ongoing information system are inherently retrospective, a 
firm that is innovative in its investment decisions (e.g., considers new product 
lines) will also rely on ad hoc data to inform its investment decisions. 
In general, the purpose of the first formal, systematic use of accounting data 
in firm management was the use of mercantile accounts to monitor managers’ 
(as well as customers’ and suppliers’) honesty (monitoring people for honesty, 
in fig. 3.1). During the nineteenth century, firms began to use accounting and 
cost  data  to  monitor  activities  internal  to the  firm  (monitoring processes 
and monitoring people for effort). Once these data were being produced to 
monitor internal firm activity, managers began to use them to inform short- 
term  planning  decisions.  As  managers  faced  new  strategic  and  techno- 
logical choices, they adapted these measures and produced new ones. It was 
only  in firms with already well-developed internal information systems that 
we observe the use of such data for long-term  planning (see Levenstein 1991, 
chap. 2). 
3.3  Very Brief Organizational History of the Dow Chemical Company 
The Midland Chemical Company was incorporated in 1892 on the basis of 
an invention by  Herbert Dow for the electrolytic production of bromine from 
brine. Its financial backers were a group of Cleveland businessmen, none of 
whom had a background in chemistry. It was located in Midland, Michigan, 
where there were underground springs with a relatively high bromine content. 
Despite the advantages of Herbert Dow’s new technology, there were both 
technological and marketing bugs to be worked out. The bromine market was 
at that time controlled by a cartel. This cartel was essentially run by two large 
fine  chemical manufacturers,  Powers  and  Weightman  of  Philadelphia and 
Mallinckrodt Chemical Works of St. Louis, who were the only wholesale dis- 
tributors of pharmaceutical bromides in the United States.13 Dow,  as general 
manager of the new firm, advocated that the Midland Company operate inde- 
pendently of  the cartel. He believed it could supply the entire American mar- 
13. For a more detailed description of  the structure of  the bromine cartel in this period, see 
Levenstein (1989). 76  Margaret Levenstein 
ket at a lower cost than the current producers.14 This proved impossible be- 
cause of the established reputations of the older firms.I5 
With a variety of technical problems and nowhere to sell the output Midland 
was  producing,  finances became  extremely tight.  They  were  a  continual 
source of  friction between the Cleveland investors and Dow.  In  late  1893, 
B. E. Helman, the company treasurer and largest stockholder, fired Dow from 
his position as general manager. He was replaced by Henry S. Cooper, a less 
innovative but also less obstinate man, with a background in manufacturing 
but not in chemistry. in 1894 the Midland Chemical Company contracted with 
Powers and Weightman and Mallinckrodt Chemical Works to sell all of  its 
output to them at a fixed, and very profitable, price. In return it agreed to limit 
its output to a predetermined amount, about 50 percent of its capacity. 
Dow remained in the employ of Midland, nominally as its secretary. Most 
of  his time was  devoted to developing processes for extracting the chlorine 
and magnesium that remained in the waste brine after the bromine was ex- 
tracted. After an explosion in the experimental chlorine bleach plant, Helman 
vetoed further development of  a bleach process, and Dow left the employ of 
the company he had founded three years before. 
The Midland Chemical Company continued to produce bromides, selling 
them through the cartel, but engaged in little or no further research and devel- 
opment and reinvested little of  its profits. It had no incentive to invest in in- 
creased capacity or improved quality, given its relationship with Mallinckrodt 
and Powers and Weightman. In summary, Midland adopted a very successful 
“adaptive” strategy of  living off  the profits of  Dow’s initial innovations, but 
without engaging in the more risky technological or marketing strategies as- 
sociated with continued innovation.  l6 
In  1895 Herbert  Dow,  again  with  the  backing  of  Cleveland  investors, 
formed a new company, the Dow Process Company, in Navarre, Ohio, to de- 
velop an electrolytic process to extract chlorine from brine. This company 
never produced chlorine on a commercial scale and was taken over in  1897 by 
the newly formed Dow Chemical Company. The Dow Chemical Company’s 
plant was adjacent to the Midland Chemical Company. It received the Mid- 
land’s waste debrominated brine, and from this extracted chlorine for bleach 
manufacture. 
Unlike the Midland Company, Herbert Dow’s new company pursued a pol- 
icy of  investing in the development of  new products and processes to take 
14. See letter from H. H. Dow to 9.  E. Helman, 9 December 1892, file 920021-Ax, Herbert 
H. Dow Papers, Post Street Archives, Midland, MI. 
15. See letter from H. H. Dow to F.  G. Trimble, Asst Sec’y Manistee Development Co., Man- 
istee, MI, 20 September 1905; “Some  12 or 15 years ago we attempted to dispose of  some Bro- 
mide on the open market, and we went all over the country offering it at about 60% of  the recog- 
nized market value and could not dispose of it although our Bromide was better than the competing 
article. The wholesale Drug houses told us they had no demand for KBr [potassium bromide] of 
an unknown make” (file 050039~.  Dow Papers). 
16. See Lazonick (1988 and 1990) for further discussion of innovative and adaptive strategies. 77  The Use of  Cost Measures 
advantage of both its natural resource and human capital bases. The ultimate 
decisions regarding the company’s investment policy  were still made by  a 
Cleveland board of  directors, but Dow’s intention from the beginning was to 
pursue an innovative strategy. He  wrote to M. B.  Johnson on 5 June 1897, 
offering him the position of superintendent of the new plant: “We expect with 
your assistance to beat the world on bleaching powder in the next year or two 
and  on numerous other substances in years to follow” (file 970073c, Dow 
Papers). By 1914 the Dow Chemical Company was producing at least a dozen 
other chlorine-consuming products and a dozen different kinds of  bromine 
compounds, and was embarking on research into organic synthesis that made 
it the first U.S. company to synthesize indigo dyes. 
In  1898 Herbert Dow regained control of the Midland Chemical Company 
and was named its president. Helman’s stock was purchased by  other Cleve- 
land investors and a new trebsurer, H. E. Hackenberg, was elected. Hacken- 
berg was the treasurer of the National Carbon Company, a much larger chem- 
ical company based in Cleveland.” The general manager of the Midland was 
replaced by a Dow Chemical Company employee, James Graves. In 1900 the 
two companies were merged. Herbert Dow was named general manager and 
James Graves superintendent of the new firm. Hackenberg became its secre- 
tary. 
Continued innovation in its production processes gave the Dow Company 
access to technologies with large economies of scale. Continued innovation in 
product development led  it  into new markets and encouraged it to develop 
closer ties to the final consumers of its products. In each case, Dow’s strategy 
of  technological innovation led it into conflict with the existing distribution 
organizations in  the pharmaceutical and chemical markets.  In  most cases, 
these organizations divided up market share, restricted output, and kept the 
manufacturer at arm’s length from  its customers.  Thus in  1902, the  Dow 
Company withdrew  from its long-standing arrangement with  Mallinckrodt 
and Powers and Weightman. In 1904, it canceled its exclusive agency agree- 
ment for the distribution of its bleach. In  1905, it established its own sales 
organization. 
Despite periods of very slim profits, largely the result of a series of severe 
price wars in the various markets in which the Dow Chemical Company sold 
its products,  the company pursued  an aggressive strategy of  both  absolute 
growth and product diversification in the period up to World War I. There were 
other trace elements left in the brine after the bromine and chlorine were re- 
moved. The company was continually engaged in research to identify new, 
inexpensive ways to extract these elements, and to find or create new sources 
17. Hackenberg was secretary of the National Carbon Company (of Ohio) until  1899. In  that 
year he became treasurer of the National Carbon Company (of New Jersey). That firm was created 
in  1899 as the result of a nationwide merger of carbon companies. In  1917 it merged with Union 
Carbide to found Union Carbide and Carbon. See letter from H. E. Hackenberg to  H. S.  Cooper, 
26 January  1899, file 990047x, Dow  Papers, and Chandler (1977,355). 78  Margaret Levenstein 
of demand for their consumption. The company was also engaged in research 
to find new uses for the bromine and chlorine that it could produce in much 
greater supply than could be consumed in existing markets. 
3.4  Accounting and Strategy at Dow 
The design of the accounting system, and the kinds of  information that it 
produced, reflect both the changes in the organizational structure and the stra- 
tegic posture of the company over this period. The order of the introduction 
of  these changes was similar to that of  other manufacturing firms described 
above. More specifically, I find that, from  1892 to  1898, the design of  the 
accounting system of  the Midland Chemical Company (1892-1900)  was es- 
sentially mercantile. By that I mean that it was designed to keep track of trans- 
actions with outsiders to the firm (in fig. 3.1, monitoring people for honesty). 
The only regularly produced internal report,  the general manager’s weekly 
report to the treasurer, mimicked the account statement of an outside supplier 
to the firm (fig. 3.2). While this system provided necessary information for 
the provision of funds to the manufacturing plant, it was not used on a regular 
basis to inform decision making at the plant level or for the monitoring of 
plant  management by  the  board  of  directors (i.e., neither for  monitoring 
people for effort nor for monitoring processes nor for planning). The small 
size of the firm (itself the result of the strategy pursued) did not require it to 
develop formal systems for monitoring employees. The noncompetitive mar- 
ket in which the firm sold its products permitted, if it did not actually encour- 
age, a relatively lax attitude toward cost saving.’* 
When the Dow Chemical Company began operations in  1897, it adopted a 
more aggressive, innovative attitude both toward the improvement of produc- 
tion technology and the development of new output markets. This was accom- 
panied by  the systematic calculation and use of  several measures of produc- 
tion efficiency. This included weekly estimation of the average (variable) cost 
of bleach, as well as several nonmonetary measures of technical efficiency and 
quality. During the first four years of  the company’s existence, this measure 
(of average variable cost) was used primarily by the company’s board of direc- 
tors as a device to monitor plant management (i.e.,  monitoring people for 
effort). The nonmonetary measures were more important in plant-level deci- 
sion making (i.e., short-term planning). 
After the merger of Midland and Dow Chemical in 1900, a new set of re- 
ports gave not only average product costs but also average profit on the firm’s 
two primary products, bleach and potassium bromide. In  1905, at the urging 
of a public accounting firm, the Dow Company modified its costing system to 
permit a calculation of net income for each of  its ten products. At the same 
18. For  a similar case of  high  profits diminishing the demand for information, see Yates’s 
discussion of Illinois Central (section 4.1 in this volume). 79  The Use of  Cost Measures 
Fig. 3.2  General manager H. S. Cooper’s weekly report, Midland Chemical 
Company, 1894-99 
time, it resisted the suggestion of its auditors to calculate measures of average 
total cost by allocating its fixed costs among its products.1g  While the account- 
19. The practice of  allocating fixed costs to determine average total cost of  product is perhaps 
the defining characteristic of  those information systems that Johnson refers to (chap. 2 in  this 
volume) as “cost accounting” systems. These measures of  average total costs are used to value 80  Margaret Levenstein 
ing and information system went through several modifications between 1901 
and 1914, each facilitated the calculation and comparison of net income on an 
increasing number of products. This measure was used both as a monitor of 
managerial performance at Midland (i.e., monitoring people for effort) and, 
more informally, to aid the board of  directors in making decisions regarding 
which product lines to pursue (i.e., long-term planning). 
Unlike the procedure adopted at Du Pont during this period, the Dow Com- 
pany did not regularly or systematically calculate or compare rates of  return 
on each of these products.20  Rather it treated the largest costs of the firm, the 
fixed, joint costs of the wells, power plant, and so forth, as essentially sunk 
costs. These costs were not allocated to any products. Separate accounts were 
established to keep track of the development expenses of new products; infor- 
mal comparisons between expected net income and the cost of development 
were frequently made. These measures were included in discussions by  the 
board of directors of product development policy, capital allocation decisions, 
and so forth, though no rule was formulated specifying minimum expected 
returns on the incremental investment in a particular product (as was the case 
at Du Pont). That is to say, these data were used to inform long-term planning 
decisions, but there was no attempt to make these decisions a rourine function 
of these data. 
In summary, like other manufacturing firms of  the period, Herbert Dow’s 
chemical  companies  initially  relied  on  mercantile  accounting  techniques, 
which focused on transactions with outsiders to the firm. The only internal 
information produced was designed to perform a similar function, that  is, 
monitoring people for honesty. Later, as the companies began  to pursue a 
more innovative strategy, more information was required. In the first phase of 
this new strategy, the focus was on developing new products and new produc- 
tion techniques. Information on product  costs and technical efficiency was 
collected to satisfy this new demand. This information was used first to mon- 
itor people for effort and to monitor processes, and soon after to aid in short- 
term planning decisions. The company soon realized, in typical Chandlerian 
fashion, that in order to successfully pursue the product diversification strat- 
egy adopted in the first phase,  it must revise its marketing and distribution 
strategy. This required a new kind of information, and we soon observe the 
production of  data on price-cost differentials and net income for individual 
products. These new measures allowed the board of directors to better monitor 
plant management’s performance of  this more complex strategy (i.e., moni- 
inventories in the financial accounts, thus providing the link between the costing system and the 
financial accounting system. See Levenstein (1991, chap. 5)  for a more detailed description of 
Dow ’s capital accounting procedures and the influence of  accountancy thereon. 
20. For a more detailed description of  Du Pont’s use of rate of return measures in capital allo- 
cation decisions, see Chandler (1977) and Johnson (1975). 81  The Use of  Cost Measures 
toring people for effort) as well as make better-informed long-term planning 
decisions. 
3.5  The Evolution of the Information System at Midland 
3.5.1  Stage I: Accounting for Cash 
In the early years of the Midland Chemical Company, before bromides were 
being produced and sold at a profit, the company’s record keeping focused on 
estimating and reporting cash flows over short lengths of time (i.e., days and 
weeks). These measures were used for two purposes. The first was to inform 
Treasurer Helman, in Cleveland, of the cash needs of the production unit in 
Midland. The second was to inform both the management in Midland and the 
stockholders in Cleveland of the achievement or proximity to profitability, that 
is to say, whether the firm was  producing bromides regularly and cheaply 
enough that  the business  was  profitable. Each  of  these purposes required 
somewhat different information. 
The only systematic reporting of  information to Cleveland was a weekly 
report that Herbert Dow sent to B. E. Helman. This report was first produced 
in April 1892 (see file 920021-Ax, Dow Papers). No copies of this report have 
been found, but correspondence indicates that it included all of the cash ex- 
penditures made during the week at Midland. These expenditures included 
payroll and any other small, inexpensive items purchased. Invoices for more 
expensive items were sent to Helman for payment. 
These reports gave the Cleveland office information about the cash expend- 
itures at the plant,  but  in and  of  themselves gave little information about 
whether or not Herbert Dow’s process was going to be profitable (about which 
there was some question) or what the future demands for cash would be. In 
the period before the contract with Powers and Weightman and Mallinckrodt 
Chemical Works was signed, demands for cash frequently meant demands on 
the pocketbooks of the Cleveland investors, since receipts for sales were few 
and far between. Ad hoc reports were prepared to fill this gap. 
At the end of  1892, Helman visited Midland, and Dow and Helman esti- 
mated the daily expenses of the company. Helman included in this estimate an 
amount for depreciation and 7 percent interest on capital invested. Dow wrote 
to another investor, J. H. Osborn, that “profits would not be  counted at all 
unless they exceeded 7%.”21  This suggests that the reason for the determina- 
tion of daily expenditures was to give an estimate of the required daily income 
for the firm to be earning positive economic profits, that is, covering both its 
actual and its opportunity costs. On the other hand, in this letter to Osbom, 
Dow gives an estimate of the daily expenses, without interest, suggesting that 
21. H.  H.  Dow  to J. H.  Osborn, 16 December 1892, file 920021-Ax, Dow  Papers. 82  Margaret Levenstein 
this is how much they needed to “see us through.” Dow’s estimates do include 
a daily charge for depreciation, which did not reflect a cash expenditure. Thus 
the estimate of daily expenses was intended both to give an idea of future cash 
needs and the proximity to profitability; it did both only with some mismea- 
surement . 
In the terms of figure 3.1, these systematically produced data were not ame- 
nable to use in short-term planning. This is not to say that there was no cost 
consciousness at Midland during its early years. Quite to the contrary, the lack 
of funds led to a preoccupation,  on the part of both plant and Cleveland man- 
agement, with minute expenditures .22 Rather, the weekly reports were not de- 
signed or used to aid in cost cutting. They were used to some extent to monitor 
the activities,  as reflected  in the list of  expenditures, of plant management, 
but did not provide  sufficient information  to the Cleveland  stockholders  to 
evaluate the wisdom of those expenditures. For example, Helman wrote on 6 
November 1893, “I must ask you to cut down on every expense and keep it as 
low as possible.  Can you figure out for me the following. 1. What can you 
make the average weekly output? Give me a safe figure. 2.  To make this what 
would be your expense? Itemize it. If  we can save on the fuel item we must 
do it. I only wish I had the $200 for you” (file 930007c, Dow Papers). Despite 
weekly reports and frequent letters, this information was not readily available. 
3.5.2  Stage 2:  Information in an Adaptive Firm 
After the contracts with Powers and Weightman and Mallinckrodt Chemical 
Works were signed and the profitability of the company was assured, Midland 
had to decide whether it would continue to pursue an innovative  strategy in 
other product areas, as the gains to innovation in bromine were limited by the 
output restrictions in the new contract, or whether it would “consume”  the 
high profits generated by the new contract.  There was a brief period during 
which the company supported  Herbert Dow’s further research into chlorine 
and magnesium  production,  but the stockholders  (and particularly  Helman) 
were not  willing to accept either the risk  or the  reinvestment  of the firm’s 
surplus that such a strategy required. Dow’s research support was cut off, and 
he left the full-time employ of the company. 
This set of decisions, to refrain  from significant investment in improving 
the bromine process, to allow other firms to market its product, and to restrict 
its product line to crude potassium bromide, had several significant implica- 
tions for the development of the information system over the following years. 
First, the high profitability  itself (the company paid monthly dividends of 
2-3  percent)  seems to have lessened concern for cost cutting.  There is cer- 
tainly less discussion of  such matters in the correspondence between Midland 
and Cleveland during the following years. 
22. See, for example, letters from H. H. Dow to B. E. Helman, 13  June  1892, 31 June [sic] 
1892, 5 July 1892, 13 July 1892, and 9 December 1892, file 920021-Ax, in which he responds to 
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Second,  the  nature  of  the  sales  contract,  which  inhibited  competition 
among bromide producers and prevented any contact between Midland and its 
customers (and therefore the establishment of  any reputation associated with 
its brand), provided no incentive for the firm to produce a higher-quality prod- 
uct. Hence, information regarding product quality was not produced as regu- 
larly as would be the case later on, and such information as was produced was 
usually not forwarded to Cleveland. 
Third, the need for secrecy to protect its negotiating position vis-his  the 
cartel came to outweigh any benefits to the systematic production of cost data. 
Years  later, Herbert Dow wrote, “If a pound of pure Bromide cost the same 
in  the  old  Midland  Chemical  Co.  plant  a  pound  of  its commercial Bro- 
mide would have cost [$].0846. This is about what the actual cost was but I 
think Mr. Hackenberg will be able to give the exact figure. We  were so par- 
ticular about our costs not  being made public that I have  not  been able to 
find any document in which it is given” (about May 1904, file 030044x, Dow 
Papers). 
Thus the quantity of  information produced for managerial use during this 
period was limited. In terms of  thefunctions  of  information, the data were 
used  primarily to monitor people for honesty, in  both internal and external 
relationships. 
Three different reports were produced during this period, each of which will 
be discussed in more detail below. Cooper continued the practice, begun by 
Dow,  of  submitting a weekly statement of  his “personal” account with the 
company (fig. 3.2). Helman produced annual (and then semiannual) financial 
statements (fig. 3.3). And  for approximately one year, Cooper prepared and 
submitted  to  another  important  Cleveland  stockholder,  J. H.  Osborn,  a 
weekly report on plant activity. 
The limited number and content of these reports reflected the strategic atti- 
tude of the firm. None of these reports included measures of the monetary cost 
or technical quality of product. While the weekly reports sent to Osborn did 
include physical measures of output and input consumption (per week), these 
data do not appear to have been used by  plant management (i.e., for short- 
term planning), and their production was shortly discontinued. Helman’s fi- 
nancial reports were not produced frequently enough, or even with enough 
continuity of  content, to be very useful in evaluating managerial success or 
failure (i.e., monitoring people for effort). The lack of  such data both rein- 
forced the existing managerial attitude toward the importance of cost cutting, 
particularly relative to the enormous concern displayed regarding renegotia- 
tion of  the exclusive sales contracts, and denied managers information that 
would have aided in more aggressive cost cutting. 
3.5.2.1  Henry Cooper’s Weekly Report 
After Henry S. Cooper replaced Herbert Dow as manager of the Midland 
plant in November 1893, he submitted a weekly report to Helman that showed 84  Margaret Levenstein 
cash received (from Helman) and dispensed (fig. 3.2).23  The report was de- 
signed to mimic the statements of account prepared for outsiders to the firm 
(i.e., the firm’s suppliers). The form itself is identical to that used for sup- 
pliers’ accounts. The amounts spent in Midland appear exactly as if they were 
items supplied by Cooper to the firm (e.g., “By Paid for freight,” “By Paid for 
Pay Roll,” and “By Paid for Wood”); the amounts received by C0oper2~  appear 
as if they were payments made to him.25  Thus while it was the only systematic 
communication to Cleveland on the internal activity of the firm, the form of 
the report constrained it to reporting “mercantile” information (i.e., monitor- 
ing  Cooper  for  honesty).  Occasionally the  report  would  disaggregate the 
weekly payroll, as in the bottom half of  the form shown in  fig. 3.2. There 
were no folio numbers or any indication that these costs were aggregated into 
subsidiary accounts. There was no information about production or sales ac- 
tivity, though Helman was notified of shipments to Mallinckrodt and Powers 
and Weightman by the submission of a copy of the invoice. Cooper also oc- 
casionally wrote notes to Helman at the bottom of  the form indicating his 
expected cash needs, for example, “Will need about $250. per week for wood 
for a while.”26 
The continued use of a general manager’s personal account, to which all of 
the Midland expenditures of the firm were credited on the company’s ledger, 
made it impossible to calculate input costs or fluctuations therein. Expendi- 
tures included in this account do not appear to have ever been disaggregated 
into accounts breaking down the cost of  product. Thus when Cooper, after 
Helman’s departure from the company, asked the new treasurer for informa- 
tion about the cost of potash, Hackenberg could not easily extract this infor- 
mation from Helman’s accounts. Cooper had not, in his own capacity as gen- 
eral  manager,  kept  records  that  would  allow  him  to  measure these  input 
costs  .27 
Thus while this report was produced with frequency and regularity, its con- 
tent and method of  aggregation did not lend themselves to use in the “plan- 
ning” functions discussed above. This report did permit Helman to monitor 
Cooper’s dispensation of  the cash sent to him,  and thus detect gross fraud 
(i.e., monitoring him for honesty), as suggested by  the mercantile form, but 
it did not facilitate an evaluation of  his performance as general manager (i.e., 
monitoring him for effort). However, since Cooper (and his brother) had  a 
23. See files 980053~  and c,  990039c, 990038c, and oooO50c, Dow Papers. 
24. By chance, no such receipts appear on the report shown in fig. 3.2,  as Cooper had received 
no check from Cleveland during the week covered. 
25. It should be  clear that Cooper’s account is fictitious. Cooper was an employee, not an inside 
contractor. He was not the residual claimant to this account (i.e.,  to the amount of $56.22  listed 
“By Balc”). The local bank accounts to  which these amounts were deposited and charges drawn 
were in the name of the Midland Chemical Company, not Cooper. 
26. See report no. 265,5  December 1898, file 980053x, Dow Papers. 
27. See letter from H. E. Hackenberg to  H. S. Cooper, 26 January  1899, file 990047x, Dow 
Papers. 85  The Use of Cost Measures 
sizable stockholding in the company, the use of a direct performance measure 
was probably considered unnecessary. 
3.5.2.2  B. E. Helman’s Financial Statements 
Helman produced financial statements, from a set of ledgers kept in Cleve- 
land, on an annual and sometimes semiannual basis (fig. 3.3). The first such 
Fig. 3.3  Midland Chemical Company annual report 1894 86  Margaret Levenstein 
statement known to have been  produced,  though no  copy  still exists,  was 
dated January  1894.**  The June  1898 report was the last produced by  Hel- 
man.29  Copies of these statements were distributed to the board of directors of 
the company.  30 
The statement displayed in figure 3.3, the earliest one produced, consists 
of a one-page balance sheet. The assets and expenditures of the firm are listed 
in the left-hand column. The liabilities, equity, and income are listed in the 
right-hand column. Most of the accounts listed (e.g., cases, fuel, ashes, “Pot- 
ash, Bot.”) represent the cost of  goods and materials that the firm had pur- 
chased during the period. The accounts listed by  individual name (except for 
Dr. Salisbury, who was an independent pharmaceutical sales agent) represent 
loans to and from the firm to its principal stockholders. Note that Dow has 
two accounts listed,  one of which is his personal account and the other of 
which represents his account as manager of the company, as described above. 
The account listed for H. S.  Cooper represents his account as general manager 
following Dow’s dismissal. While the statement is at variance with modem 
standard accounting procedures in many ways, some of the accounts listed are 
quite familiar to modem readers. The asset side of the balance sheet includes 
patents, real estate, plant and equipment, and accounts “due us.” The liability 
side of  the balance sheet includes the capital stock (though the amount of 
$100,000 is incorrect) and accounts “due from us.” 
These statements always included a balance sheet, and sometimes included 
sales, inventory, and “loss and gain” statements. No  separate income state- 
ment was ever produced during Helman’s reign as treasurer. Instead, sales are 
listed as liabilities on the balance sheet (e.g., “Crude KBr., [$] 13781[.]73”). 
The cost of product already sold is included with the cost of materials inven- 
tories, labor, and so forth, still in stock as an asset of the firm (e.g., the ac- 
count “Potash, Bot.”  might include the cost of  potash currently in stock as 
potash, the cost of potash now stored as potassium bromide inventories, and 
the cost of potash in potassium bromides already sold). Thus, the value of the 
potash account on the balance sheet did not report the (historical) value of the 
potash stock of  the firm.31  Rather it aggregated the cost of  potash consumed 
during the previous year and the value of the existing stock. The cost of potash 
consumed in producing the previous year’s output was  never disaggregated. 
Thus, even on an annual basis, it was nearly impossible to estimate fluctua- 
tions in the cost of inputs. This was true as well for estimates of the total cost 
of production and, therefore, for the profitability of the firm. 
28. See letters between B. E. Helman and H. S. Cooper, January  1894, file 940001c, Dow 
Papers. There are still in existence annual and semiannual financial statements produced by  Hel- 
man from June 1894, January  1895, June 1896, December  1896, January 1898, and June 1898. 
See files 940017~.  950080~.  and 9601 1  Ix. 
29. File 960111x, Dow Papers.  See letter from J. H. Osborn to H. H. Dow,  10 June  1898, 
indicating that this was the last report produced by Helman (file 980013~). 
30. See letter from H. H. Dow to H. S. Cooper, 24 January 1896, file 960027~.  Dow Papers. 
3  1. Because of Helman’s peculiar method of  keeping the accounts, it did not report the entire 
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These statements, distributed only to the board of directors of the company, 
provided very general information about how  funds had been spent, the in- 
debtedness of the company, and so forth. The information was not available 
to most plant managers, except for Dow and Cooper, and therefore would 
have been of limited use in short-term planning even had the report been pro- 
duced frequently enough for such a purpose. Because of the unusual aggre- 
gation of  the accounts, inhibiting the measure of  costs over time, the data 
were not amenable for use in evaluating the performance of plant management 
(i.e., monitoring people for effort). Thus, the frequency, the type of aggrega- 
tion, and the degree of  dissemination of  these reports, like Cooper’s weekly 
report,  reflect a focus on monitoring people for honesty, rather any use in 
monitoring people for effort or providing information for short- or long-term 
planning. 
3.5.2.3  J. H.  Osborn’s Report 
The  only  indication of  any  systematic reporting  of  plant  operations to 
Cleveland during this period is found in correspondence between Cooper and 
J. H. Osborn, the first vice-president of the company, during 1895 and 1896. 
After making a series of requests for information about plant activities and 
costs in letters, Osborn asked that Cooper send him a regular report. 
Some time  ago Mr.  Dow  gave me  some figgures  [sic] refering  [sic] to 
amount of product per amount of current . . . Have you or can you verify 
these figgures. Do you keep account of the [  ] current used daily I pre- 
sume you keep a record of shipments made if so I wish you would send me 
a complete list of shipments since Jan first of this year; and also amount of 
labor and salary up there and  if  you  have the record the one amount of 
current used. I have not heretofore had any regular reports nor indeed know 
very much about how things were running up there as I never could get any 
reports from Herbert [Dow]  . I should like to have monthly report if you can 
find time to make it  out and in order to make as little work for you  as 
possible I think perhaps I will make out a form and have some printed and 
sent you so that you will simply need to fill in the figgure and mail it to me. 
I am often at a disadvantage when talking with Mr.  Helman and I know 
very little about what is going on unless he chooses to tell me. I am of the 
opinion which I think I expressed when there that you should keep a careful 
record there of all that is done day by day because it might be useful some- 
time-another  thing I would like to know if possible that is exactly how 
much potash there is in a pound of  KBr as you make it. (10 September 
1895, file 950019c, Dow Papers) 
Osborn had the form printed in Cleveland and sent to Cooper.32  There is no 
indication that Cooper ever sent copies of this report to Helman. No copies of 
this report still exist, but correspondence indicates that it included potassium 
32. See letter from J. H. Osborn to  H. S. Cooper, 14 November 1895: “I sent you  by mail a 
few days since a package of blank reports. I expect you have received them ere this. I was a long 
time getting them they were in the printers hands for some time’’ (file 950019c, Dow Papers). 88  Margaret Levenstein 
bromide produced, inventoried, and “in works” per week, and daily power 
con~umption.~~  It did not include any measure of technical efficiency akin to 
the “bleach output per ampere day,”  which would later be calculated at the 
Dow Chemical Company. Osborn did, himself, use the data to calculate out- 
put (pounds of potassium bromide) per  The report did not include 
any measure of average cost. The reports were produced for about a year, until 
November 1896. While Osborn occasionally made comments suggesting his 
pleasure or displeasure at the results achieved by Cooper (i.e., used the data 
to monitor effort), his primary use of these data was in formulating the com- 
pany’s  position in contract negotiations with the bromine cartel. That winter 
Osborn went into semiretirement, and there is no indication that the reports 
were continued in his absence from Cleveland. 
The Midland’s accounting system in this period (1  892-98)  was quite typi- 
cal of  nineteenth-century manufacturing  The techniques (i.e., the re- 
ports and account books) did not innovate on those used by mercantile firms. 
Thus the information available was useful in  monitoring people for honesty 
but in none of the other potential functions of  information discussed above. 
Given the strategic posture of the firm and the market in which it was operat- 
ing, this information was sufficient to sustain a very profitable enterprise. 
3.5.3 
While the Midland Chemical Company was pursuing a strictly adaptive 
strategy, in terms of production technology, product line expansion, and mar- 
keting, Herbert Dow was taking the Dow Process and then the Dow Chemical 
Company on a different path. This meant being more innovative in terms of 
product and process but, for the first five years, did not mean deviating from 
the historical norms in the distribution of 
The changes in the information system were similarly gradual. Thus, dur- 
ing the Dow  Process Company period (1895-97),  the “mercantile” form of 
the general manager’s weekly report was  adopted from Midland Company 
practice (see fig. 3.4). However, daily time cards, which gave both plant and 
Cleveland management more detailed information about internal plant activ- 
ity, were also introduced. When the Dow Chemical Company was founded, 
Stage 3:  Information in an Innovative Firm 
33. See letters from J. H. Osborn to H. S. Cooper, 5  December 1895, file 950019~.  4 March 
1896, and 20 March 1896, file 960001x, Dow Papers. 
34. See letter from J. H. Osborn to H. S. Cooper, 5  December  1895, file 950019~.  Dow Pa- 
pers. 
35. See, for example, Chandler’s (1977) description of  the Lyman textile mills or McGaw’s 
(1985) description of  the Berkshire paper manufacturers. 
36. The question of the optimal degree of vertical integration was already an item of discussion 
at both Midland and Dow. Herbert Dow continued to argue that the Midland should sell its product 
independently of the bromine cartel. When Hackenberg became a stockholder of the Dow Chem- 
ical Company in 1900, he also began to urge that it consider forward integration. He wrote, “1 do 
not wish to be considered presumptuous, especially at this early stage, in again suggesting to you 
the advisability of  making all sales direct instead of through Sales Agents, and hope this matter 
will be considered in the near future” (June 1900, file oooO55x, Dow Papers). 89  The Use of  Cost Measures 
Fig. 3.4  General manager’s weekly report, Dow Process Company, 1895-97 
while the firm certainly continued to keep financial accounts, the general man- 
ager’s “personal” account report was dropped. It was replaced by a report that 
included measures of  technical efficiency and product cost (fig. 3.5). For the 
first time, the firm’s formal information system was being used by the board 
of  directors to monitor and evaluate plant management  (i.e., monitoring for 
effort), and by plant management to make short-term planning decisions. 
Similar changes were enacted at Midland after Dow regained control of the 
firm. The general manager’s weekly “personal”  account report was replaced 
by one modeled on the Dow Chemical Company report (fig. 3.6).  Hackenberg 
also introduced the production of  uniform monthly financial statements (fig. 90  Margaret Levenstein 
3.7).37  These changes reflect  the  influence  of  Hackenberg’s  greater  back- 
ground in accountancy than that of earlier management as well as the more ag- 
gressive strategy of the firm in both minimizing costs and improving quality. 
3.5.3.  I 
While the Dow Process Company had a very short life and never produced 
bleach on a commercial scale, its record keeping procedures represent an im- 
portant  transition  period, in which Herbert  Dow demonstrated,  for the first 
time, an interest in using formal costing procedures in company management. 
The primary systematic communication between the plant (in Navarre, Ohio) 
and the investors (in Cleveland) remained, as at Midland, a weekly statement 
of the “personal account” of  the general manager (fig. 3.4). However, a new 
information-gathering device, the daily time card, was introduced at the plant. 
These cards  were  introduced  primarily  to  improve  “accountability”  (i.e., 
monitoring employees for effort, providing an incentive for greater effort) on 
the part of the employees but, once produced, were also used to calculate and 
compare costs over time. Thus, they were amenable for use by Herbert Dow 
in  making  short-term  planning  decisions  about  changes  in  the  developing 
bleach process. 
The weekly report Herbert Dow sent to Cleveland was similar to those he 
and H.  S.  Cooper sent to Helman for the Midland.38  It focused on cash trans- 
actions at the plant.  The first report is dated September  1895, the last May 
1897; thus it covered the entire period of the company’s existence. The form 
is a one-page, double-entry  list of  the receipts and expenditures made at the 
plant in Navarre. The receipts, reported as “To check from THE DOW PRO- 
CESS CO. ,” are debited to Herbert Dow’s “general manager’s account” on the 
books of the Dow Process Company. That account is credited with the expend- 
itures made at Navarre  (e.g., labor costs, postage,  freight, etc.), which  are 
listed individually below. 
These reports were  sent to James Pardee, the secretary and treasurer and 
Herbert Dow’s former classmate at the Case School.39  They were entered by 
him into the financial books of the company, which, like the Midland’s, were 
kept in Cleveland. If any financial statements were prepared from these books, 
they have not been located. 
After receiving Dow’s first report, Pardee suggested that he modify his rec- 
ord keeping for payroll. He wrote, “Your report is all right only that you had 
better make out a payroll for your labor and have the men sign it. This might 
Information at the Dow  Process Company 
37. As described by Yates (chap. 4 in this volume), the attempt to achieve greater uniformity in 
reports was accomplished  by  the replacement of  a typed report with a printed blank form into 
which the month’s entries were made. 
38. See files 970086 and 950034, Dow Papers. 
39. Pardee became vice-president of the Dow Chemical Company in 1901 and chairman of  the 
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be done in a book which you can keep and make copy and send to me. What 
are the items for your labor account of $59.61 to September 17.”40 
Dow went further than simply having his employees sign the payroll book. 
He instituted a system of daily time cards for all  employee^.^' The use of these 
time cards is the first instance of any interest displayed, on Dow’s part, in the 
use of accounting or cost data in management. A similar system was used in 
the Dow Chemical Company throughout the entire period of  this study. His 
reasons for introducing these cards were discussed in a letter to H. S. Cooper, 
in which he urges Cooper to do the same. “We have every man fill out a labor 
time card.  I think  men are more liable to make a showing if they have to 
account for all their time in detail and it enables us to know what each thing 
costs by  referring back to cards even if  a separate account is not kept” (13 
November 1895, file 950023c, Dow Papers). That is, by monitoring effort the 
cards provided workers with an  incentive to increase their effort. The infor- 
mation, once produced for its monitoring and incentive functions, was used 
to calculate costs for short-term planning. Unfortunately, none of these cards 
appear to have survived. 
3.5.3.2 
When the Dow Chemical Company was formed, the “personal” account of 
the general manager was dropped. The new account books were designed to 
allow periodic calculations of  the cost of plant activities. The weekly report 
form (fig. 3.5) included data on the cost of  these activities (e.g., cost per 
pound, fuel cost, lime cost) and on various measures of  technical efficiency 
and the quality of product (e.g., barrels of bleach produced, pounds of bleach 
per ampere day, and percentage of chlorine in escaping gas). The latter mea- 
sures were calculated with the greatest frequency and appear to have been 
most important in the day-to-day management of the plant. The report usually 
included brief discursive remarks on plant events (shutdowns, etc.). The re- 
port included total value of sales but did not report an average price received. 
The average dollar cost of product was, however, more easily comprehen- 
sible to the nonchemist stockholders and was added to this form shortly after 
it was introduced. Cost per pound is equal to the sum of lime cost, fuel cost, 
payroll chargeable to manufacture, and all other expenditures chargeable to 
manufacture, divided by pounds of bleach manufactured. Thus there were no 
“depreciation” or allocated machinery charges included  in this measure of 
costs. This was a measure of average variable 
Information at the Dow Chemical Company 
40. 22 September 1895, file 950043c, Dow Papers. See file 950034x, report no. 1. 
41. Card-based cost systems were becoming increasingly popular during this period (see Arnold 
1899). 
42. Herbert Dow confirms this understanding of  the measure of cost in a letter to James Pardee, 
in which he says, “Enclosed please find a statement of average cost per pound making bleach for 
a number of weeks past. As more bills for current expenses are paid some weeks than others, a 92  Margaret Levenstein 
Fig. 3.5  General manager Herbert DOW’S  weekly report, Dow Chemical 
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This report  included  a summary  report  on the previous  week’s expendi- 
tures. These expenditures were divided between those chargeable to manufac- 
ture and chargeable to “eq~ipment.”~~  The inclusion of the latter item reflected 
the expectation that the company would continuously invest in its plant and 
equipment.  This was a decidedly different strategic position than that of  the 
Midland Chemical  Company; the latter distributed its surplus (and probably 
some of its capital, given its nonexistent depreciation procedures) to its stock- 
holders, rather than reinvesting in the firm. 
This format, with various modifications, usually new measures of produc- 
tion efficiency (e.g., pounds of bleach per ampere day, apparent cost per am- 
pere day, percentage of  chlorin in escaping gas, etc.), continued in use until 
the merger with the Midland Company. 
During  the first  two  years of  its  operation the  Dow  Chemical  Company 
struggled to achieve profitability. While within the plant this meant monitor- 
ing  chlorine  losses  and  the  efficiency  of  traps  and  tanks  (monitoring  pro- 
cesses),  discussions  between  Herbert  Dow and  Cleveland  stockholders  fo- 
cused on the proximity of  average costs, included in the weekly reports, to 
selling price (a proxy measure of Dow’s effort and ability, as well as indicator 
of  when the firm would cease to be a drain on the pocketbooks of its stock- 
holders and instead fill them). For example, A. W.  Smith, a large stockholder 
and Case Technical School chemistry professor writes, 
I was quite disappointed in the showing made, as I had hoped very much to 
hear by this time that the cost was below the selling price. It seems that this 
much desired state of affairs has never yet been reached. It is very essential, 
it seems to me, that every effort be made to bring this about at once, or we 
shall have a fine row on our hands with Mr. Convers [the Dow Chemical 
Company’s  president  and  largest  stockholder]  and  Co. Just  what  is  the 
cause of  the large difference between  your estimated output and that ob- 
tained? (30 April 1899, file 990003c, Dow Papers) 
However, perhaps because of the lack of  profitability, Dow does not include 
average selling price or average profits in the weekly report during this period. 
He prefers to emphasize their production of electric power at low costs or the 
comparison is not strictly reliable, and as Mr. Post has a few minor items of  expense, insurance 
for example, that are not included in the above, the exact cost would be a trifle greater than here 
shown. Depreciation would only be apparent to a small extent in the above figures” (24 October 
1898, file 980014c, Dow Papers). 
43. Maintenance charges were included in expenses “chargeable to manufacture.” Amounts 
charged to “equipment” were strictly betterment and addition charges and were not included in 
the cost of  product. The record gives no indication of  how these distinctions were made during 
this period. However, at least after H. E. Hackenberg became secretary (in 1900), the company 
followed a “conservative” policy of charging to current manufacture everything but new plant and 
equipment. For further discussion of  this, and the related question of  depreciation policy, see 
Levenstein (1991, chap. 5). 94  Margaret Levenstein 
high quality of the bleach, rather than the continued high cost of bleach or the 
declining selling price.@ 
In April 1900, after the departure of Cooper and Helman from the Midland 
and the installation of a former Dow employee as general manager, Midland 
began producing a weekly report similar to that at the Dow Company (fig. 
3.6). It provided information on both physical consumption of inputs (e.g., “po- 
tash used,” “fuel used”),  output (e.g., “pounds potassium bromide made”), 
inventories (“pounds potassium bromide in stock”), shipments (“pounds po- 
tassium bromide shipped”), and the division of the week’s expenditures be- 
tween  operations (“chargeable to manufacture”)  and betterments and addi- 
tions. It also included data on the operation and efficiency of the brine wells. 
Two measures of  efficiency, one technical and one financial, were included. 
They  were  “pounds  bromide  per  1000 lbs. brine”  and  “apparent  cost  per 
This was the first time that Midland’s report systematically distinguished 
between  expenditures on contemporaneous production and expenditures on 
plant and equipment. This reflected a change in the investment posture of the 
company. While during Helman’s tenure all profits were distributed to stock- 
holders, after Dow became president, the company accepted, at least in prin- 
ciple (it did not remain independent long enough to establish any practice), 
the notion that a portion of income would be retained and reinvested. In fact, 
the lack of any depreciation charges during Helman’s tenure suggests the pos- 
sibility that, in addition to consuming the profits of the company, the share- 
holders were also consuming its capital. 
It was also at this juncture that monthly financial reports, including an in- 
come statement, were produced for the first time (fig. 3.7). Helman had pro- 
duced his balance sheet statements only on an annual, and occasionally semi- 
annual, basis. Hackenberg, the new treasurer, had prepared a printed form for 
the new report, insuring greater regularity in the items included and in its gen- 
eral organization. These changes probably reflect Hackenberg’s greater famil- 
iarity with professional accounting procedures. That is to say, the demand for 
this change appears not to have been managerial, but rather to have arisen from 
a desire to have the account books follow c~nvention.~~  However, particu- 
larly after the merger of the Midland and Dow companies, monthly income 
figures were used for both monitoring for effort and long-term planning. 
44.  See letters from H. H. Dow to J. H. Osborn, 29 November  1898, file 980013c, and  1 
February 1899, file 990009c, Dow Papers. 
45. An  amount was entered for the latter item only three times during the twenty-five weeks 
that the form was produced. Problems measuring gaseous bromine apparently created difficulties 
in measuring output accurately on a weekly basis. Because estimates of the amount of  gaseous 
bromine contained in the “bromine towers” were necessary to calculate average cost, the form 
refers to that measure as “apparent  cost per  pound.” 
46. The firm increased its capitalization from $100,000 to $300,000 following these changes in 
the accounting system. Correspondence indicates that management felt that having more standard- 
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Thus we observe that, with the adoption of a more innovative strategic pos- 
ture by  the Midland and Dow companies, demands for new  forms of  infor- 
mation, designed to fill new functions, were created. The first systematic pro- 
duction of data on the internal operations of the firm focused on monitoring 
processes and monitoring production workers for effort. Those data were then 
used, sometimes in a modified form (i.e., input costs were aggregated to pro- 
duce a measure of average cost), for monitoring plant management for effort 
and ability and, by plant management, for short-term planning. 
3.5.4  Stage 4: Information in the Multiproduct Firm 
The systematic production and use of data in management accelerated after 
the merger of the Midland and Dow companies. The new firm was substan- 
tially larger (capitalized at over a million dollars). Immediately following the 
merger it increased its capacity considerably by constructing a second bleach 
plant, a much improved new bromide plant, and a new electric power plant. 
It also began experimenting with the addition of a third product, sulphur chlo- 
ride.  While  Dow  was somewhat notorious for his “hands on” approach to 
management of the growing firm, the increasing number of reports and grow- 
ing references to the data included in both minutes of daily meetings of plant 
management and correspondence with Cleveland indicate the new uses made 
of such information. 
After the merger in 1900, the company faced, for the first time, the difficul- 
ties in measuring cost in a multiproduct firm. Its initial response was to change 
little in how bromides and bleach costs were calculated. Where joint costs had 
to be divided, it relied on the firm’s own history as its guide. As the number 
of products of the firm increased, this response became inadequate, and new 
methods were adopted. The firm also began to produce more disaggregated 
measures of cost that reported average input costs for particular inputs (e.g., 
lime cost per pound of bleach, packaging cost per pound of bleach, etc.) that 
were product-specific. 
The information system continued and increased the production of physical 
measures of quality and efficiency. These measures were produced primarily 
for use by plant management to monitor processes and make short-term plan- 
ning decisions, but summary data (i.e., more aggregated data) were also pro- 
vided to the firm’s board of  directors on a regular basis, allowing them to 
monitor effort and ability on the part of plant management. 
The Midland Chemical Company’s practice of monthly financial statements 
was  adopted. More detailed monthly income statements for each chemical 
were also produced. The system of  monthly reports was adapted, in steps, to 
provide management, particularly at the level of  the board of  directors, with 
data that would allow it to allocate capital resources among the various prod- 
ucts on which research was conducted at Midland (i.e., to aid in  long-term 
planning). 98  Margaret Levenstein 
3.5.4.1 
A new weekly report, introduced immediately following the merger, simply 
combined the two reports of the original firms (figs. 3.5 and 3.6). This contin- 
ued to include both financial and technical data and was distributed to mem- 
bers of the board of directors as well as Dow and Graves at the Midland plant. 
However,  partly  because the production of  financial data occurred with  a 
lengthier delay, and partly because financial and technical data were made 
accessible to different members of  plant management, several modifications 
were shortly made in the regular report forms. 
In  October 1900, a new “preliminary” report form was introduced, in re- 
sponse to complaints, mostly from the treasurer Charles Post, that the length- 
ier weekly report was not being produced promptly (fig. 3.8).47  The new re- 
port was printed on one-inch-by-three-inch card  It reported only net 
pounds of bleach made and “Lbs.  [bleach] per Ampere day” (a measure of 
technical efficiency) for both  plats A  and  C  (the bleach  plants) and  net 
pounds bromide barreled and “averaged Lbs Brine pumped per minute” (also 
a measure of  technical efficiency) for plant B (the bromide plant).  Several 
copies were made each week and sent to members of  the board of directors. 
These physical measures of  output and efficiency, regularly  used  by  plant 
management in monitoring the production process, were available essentially 
instantaneously. Monetary data were available only with a delay. 
The Weekly Report: Timeliness Trade-o$s 
3.5.4.2  Monthly Cost and Ejiciency Reports 
The firm continued to produce the data that had previously been included in 
the general manager’s weekly report. It was now divided among several differ- 
47. Post wrote to Dow, “Can you arrange to have the weekly reports sent in more regularly? 1 
have frequent inquiries from the stockholders here, and it will be a great favor to me if the report 
for the previous week could be here as early as Wednesday. As you know, they are sometimes a 
week or more late, and if I could say to those inquiring that the report will be in on Wednesday, it 
would be a great convenience to us all” (27 April  1900, file oooO12c,  Dow Papers).  Dow re- 
sponded, “We can arrange to send you the output for each week on the following Monday mom- 
ing, and by  increasing our office force we could get a complete report out by Wednesday, but in 
that case there would not be enough work to keep them busy the balance of the week. As it is now 
our office force is of such size that we can get the reports of one week out of the way before the 
reports of the next one come in, but are not able to do much better than that. Under the present 
arrangement you see it would be impossible to promise the reports before Saturday afternoon, and 
they will not reach you until Monday morning” (30 April 1900, file oooO12c). Post wrote back, 
“Your letter in regard to statement received yesterday. If  [sic] course, it is not contemplated that 
you should increase the office force at present, but I was not aware that that would be necessary in 
order to get the statement in the following week, as you have sometimes sent them more promptly 
than you have been doing recently. However, if  you could send me a short statement, giving the 
production for the week, amount sold, and price received, that would answer every purpose until 
your clerk would have time to make a complete statement” (2 May 1900, file oooO12c). See file 
010070 for samples of the new report. See file 000005 for the first nine weeks of the new report 
series. 
48. The first nine weeks of the report were typed on half-size sheets of  paper. See file 000005, 
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Fig. 3.8  Preliminary weekly report, Dow Chemical Company, 1900-? 
Fig. 3.9  Monthly factory report, Dow Chemical Company, 1902?-1914? 
ent monthly reports, each of which had a somewhat different focus and audi- 
ence. The monthly  “factory  report”  (fig. 3.9) is one of  several  reports that 
were regularly produced, primarily for use by plant managers, that focused on 
technical  and quality considerations. The report  shown here gives technical 
data on the Midland bromide plant’s  production  of  liquid  bromine and am- 
monium bromide, two of  the newer products of the firm. Quality control be- 
came increasingly  important as Dow Chemical integrated  forward  and was 
faced with a more competitive environment. The purity of Dow bromides in- 
creased from about 80 percent at the time of the merger to 99 percent in 1903. 
This gave it access to the European market, which had a very restrictive phar- 
macopoeia.  It  also  allowed  it  to  support  an  increase  in  the  U.S. phar- 
macopoeia, which  it could satisfy and its less diligent domestic competitors 
could not. 
Average cost measures were included in several different reports, including 
the monthly financial statements (fig. 3.10), the “statement of monthly earn- 101  The Use of Cost Measures 
Fig. 3.11  Statement of monthly earnings, Dow Chemical Company, 1902-10 
ings” prepared for each product (fig. 3.1  l), and detailed (i.e., disaggregated) 
cost reports for each  The primary use of  the average cost measure 
was still to give the stockholders in Cleveland a simple way of monitoring the 
effort and ability of management in Midland and comparing that performance 
over time.  It was not used regularly  by  plant management to identify ineffi- 
ciencies (i.e., to monitor processes), or in other ways that would directly in- 
form short-term planning decisions about operations. 
This is partly because cost data were not produced in as timely a fashion as 
other nonfinancial  measures of production efficiency. Hence, pounds per am- 
pere day could  be  reported  on the preliminary  report,  as it  was calculated 
regularly for in-plant use, while average costs took longer to compute. When 
average costs were computed on a weekly basis, the weekly reports frequently 
fell behind. Even after monthly reports were introduced,  it was not uncom- 
mon for the reports to be late. For example, a report comparing the efficiency 
of  the Mount Pleasant and Midland bromide plants  stated, “Owing to extra 
work in Mr. Bennett’s department the monthly production statements and bal- 
ance sheets for bromine and carbonate are several months behind.  . . . Mr. 
Bennett hopes to have his statements brought down to date within two or three 
weeks,  and we should then be  able to finally check the  logic  of  the  above 
reasoning” (Statement on Bromine Losses, 28 September 1905, file 050034x, 
Dow Papers). 
49. The form reproduced in figure 3.10 was originally designed for use by the Dow Chemical 
Company but later modified for use by  a second Midland Chemical Company, whose primary 
products were chloroform and carbon tetrachloride. Only forms that have been so modified are 
still in existence. Hence the handwritten changes in some of the items on the form. 102  Margaret Levenstein 
For these and other reasons, monetary measures played a secondary role in 
both short-term planning and monitoring processes at the plant. In 1908 Her- 
bert Dow compared the relative usefulness of bookkeeping and “factory effi- 
ciency methods” for informing plant-level planning and sided heavily with the 
latter. 
Successful manufacture, as I see it, consists in having all the operations run 
right practically all the while, and in order that this may be so it is necessary 
that when one step goes wrong it shall be detected and remedied immedi- 
ately and to do so requires a means of  control that is continually at work. 
For example, we analyze the brine in our bromide plant every half hour to 
make sure that the current and brine are proportionate to each other so that 
the maximum output is obtained. For example, there are probably a thou- 
sand places where the cost of Bleach might be increased. It would be abso- 
lutely impossible to devise a book-keeping system that would detect where 
the error was, and a system that would subdivide bleach charges so that in 
case the cost were too high it could be located a little closer than it can at 
present, would undoubtedly be some advantage but the advantage would be 
so slight that in actual commercial work it would not be worth while. (To 
H. E. Hackenberg, 31 August 1908, file 080015x, Dow Papers) 
Another reason these measures of cost per pound were not used in short- 
term planning is that the data were not given to managers of individual plants. 
The only plant management that had access to these data were Dow; Graves, 
the general superintendent;  and Bennett,  the bookkeeper  and assistant trea- 
surer. Despite recognizing the benefits that might arise from giving these man- 
agers this information,  it was decided that the risk of competitors obtaining 
this information was too great to permit its wider dissemination.s0 
This measure was used to monitor the effort (and therefore provide incen- 
tives  to) of plant managers. Plant  managers  were aware of this and of  the 
general method used to calculate costs. This appears to have been sufficient to 
influence their behavior without their observing the numbers produced by the 
information system. In at least one case a bromide plant manager specifically 
asked that he be given data on the costs of his plant, and that they be system- 
atically compared with those of the other bromide plant.51 In another case a 
plant superintendent asked that the charges for power consumption to his plant 
be reduced and charged to another plant, because he was not receiving power 
at the rate desired.s2 
50. See letters from H. E. Hackenberg to H. H. Dow, 25 May  1905, file 050014~;  A. E. Con- 
vers to H. H. Dow, 22 May 1905, file 05001 Ic; H. H. Dow to A. E. Convers, 24 May 1905, file 
05001 Ix; A. E. Convers to H. H. Dow, 31 May  1905, file 050011~;  and H. H. Dow to  A. E. 
Convers, 2 June 1905, file 05001 lx, Dow Papers. 
51. See letter from Shepherd, superintendent of the Mount Pleasant bromide plant, to H. H. 
Dow, 21 March 1907, file 070052c, Dow Papers. 
52. See letter from C. W.  Jones, superintendent of the bromide plant, to H. H. Dow, 26 Sep- 
tember 1912: “For the past few weeks the extraction of B plant [the Midland bromide plant] has 
not averaged quite 90%. At least another 5% might have been extracted had we gotten the desired 103  The Use of Cost Measures 
The use of this measure as a monitor for Herbert Dow was sufficient under 
ordinary circumstances. However, when the firm’s finances reached crisis pro- 
portions in 1903, due to a fall in the price of bleach simultaneous with large 
expansion by the Dow Company, the board of directors demanded much more 
timely and more disaggregated information that would allow them to directly 
intervene in decisions that had previously been left to Dow. 
Thus in  August  1903 the executive committee of  the board of  directors 
requested the production of a weekly report on the firm’s cash  The 
report, which continued to be produced for at least two years, included cash 
received and disbursed, cash on hand (or overdraft), sales of bleach and bro- 
mides, accounts receivable, and accounts payable. 
The board was also given, from January 1902 to September 1903, a break- 
down of cost per pound for bleach into all of the component accounts to which 
current expenses were charged. This allowed them to monitor Herbert Dow’s 
decisions on a more detailed basis. These data were produced before and after 
this period, but only for the information of  Dow and Graves.54 
Thus, during this period the quantity and types of  information systemati- 
cally collected about internal operations continued to increase. In general, 
though there were exceptions, management relied on nonmonetary data for 
monitoring processes and making short-term planning decisions. Monetary 
measures were more  frequently used  for monitoring people  for effort; the 
board of  directors usually relied on highly aggregated measures to monitor 
Herbert Dow.  More disaggregated monetary measures were used to monitor 
managers farther down in the firm hierarchy. Finally, as discussed below, as 
current, as we used to get. We have been getting a good supply of  brine, but have not gotten 
sufficient current to handle it. The trouble seems to be due to favoring the caustic and chlorine 
plants. Since the maintenance of wells and cost of pumping brine is charged up to the Bromide 
plant, we are paying something that we are not permitted to use. We request that if it is not deemed 
expedient to give B plant the desired current, that a charge be made against the caustic and chlor- 
ine plants in favor of B plant, proportionate to the amount of loss we are forced to suffer; that is, a 
certain percent of the cost of maintenance of wells and pumping of brine be charged to caustic and 
chlorine plants” (file 120008x, Dow Papers). This is the first indication that I have seen of the 
costs measured by the accounting system being an issue of  tension between the managers of the 
different areas. 
53. See letter from H. E. Hackenberg to H. H. Dow, 5 August  1903, informing him that the 
executive committee would like to review all bills before payment and requesting that he send 
them “weekly all the information that you can give them of any kind relating to the business of the 
company.  I  have  written  Mr.  Bennett  to prepare  a  statement  such  as is  contemplated (file 
030028c, Dow  Papers).  The only  existing  copy  of  this  report is  dated  11 March  1905, file 
050045~. 
54. See letter from Bennett, the bookkeeper, to Hackenberg,  the secretary of  the company, 
discussing the audit report by  Haskins and Sells, 11 July  1905: “The information contained in 
Exhibit B. schedule No.  I has practically been compiled in this same form in our office here for 
the past several years for the benefit of the General Manager and the Superintendent,  who, of 
course, wish to know the cost of all raw materials etc. I believe that the President and Secretary 
both stated that such details should not be laid before them except as they cared to investigate the 
records from time to time in this office. I am forwarding these records as they may be some help 
if a new classification is desired (file 050061x, Dow Papers). 104  Margaret Levenstein 
the firm became more multiproduct, new informational forms were developed 
to aid in long-term planning. 
3.5.4.3  Measuring Profits by Product 
The most significant change in the accounting system following the merger 
was the production of data that allowed the board of directors to compare the 
profitability of its products. The computation of average profit for each prod- 
uct seems to have played an important role in shaping thinking about the rel- 
ative profitability of different products and the allocation of capital to the pro- 
duction of various products (i.e., long-term planning). Changes were made in 
the method of calculating average profits for each product in 1905 and 1909. 
Each of the changes was designed to recognize the increasing multiproduct- 
ness of the firm. 
At no point during this period do we see the regular compilation of rates of 
profit on different lines of product that Chandler (1977) and Johnson (1975) 
have argued are the culmination of the development of accounting in the mul- 
tiproduct firm. 
The  new  monthly  financial  statement  (balance  sheet  and  income  state- 
ments)  also included a report entitled “Detailed  Statement of  Earnings and 
Expenses” (fig. 3.10). In this report, the firms expenditures were divided be- 
tween  bleach  and  bromides.  Product  expenditures  were then  reported  as a 
percentage of gross earnings.  Net earnings (i.e., profits) for each product are 
reported.  Similar data were included, along with nonmonetary  data, on the 
“Statement of  Monthly Earnings” prepared for each product (fig. 3.11). The 
latter report shows manufacturing profit, while the former gives profits net of 
sales and general expense. 
The production of these measures required that the firm divide the expenses 
of  the firm between these two products.  As might be expected, the division 
chosen reflected the historical evolution of the company. The maintenance of 
wells,  for example, which had  been  the property of  the Midland Chemical 
Company, was charged entirely to bromides. When the companies were sepa- 
rate, the Midland had provided debrominated brine to the bleach company at 
no cost, and even after the merger the capacity of  the bromide plant did not 
constrain the capacity of  the bleach  plant (i.e., debrominated  brine was not 
scarce), so bromides were charged with the entire cost of  producing the raw 
brine. On the other hand, the maintenance of the electric power plant, built by 
the  Dow  Chemical  Company, was charged primarily to the cost of bleach, 
though  an estimated  charge, based  on the estimated  output of  the bromide 
plant, was charged to the cost of bromides,  and credited to bleach. Note that 
both these charges were maintenance charges.  The firm did not include any 
allocated fixed or depreciation costs in its cost of product,  even when it was 
advised to do so by outside 
55. See Levenstein (1991, chap. 5) for  a more detailed discussion of the Haskins and Sells 
report and the response of Dow management to it. 105  The Use of Cost Measures 
The use of these historically based divisions became problematic, however, 
as the  number of  products of  the  firm  increased. These procedures were 
changed as a result of the recommendations of the 1905 audit by Haskins and 
Sells.56  It had previously been the practice of  the company to produce mea- 
sures of product cost for bleach and bromides, as described above, on a regu- 
lar basis. By 1905, however, these were not the only products of the company. 
The company sold electricity and water to the City of  Midland and to other 
Midland firms. More importantly, an increasingly larger fraction of its output 
of  chlorine was not consumed as bleach. Instead chlorine itself was sold to 
other firms that had built plants adjacent to the Dow Chemical Company for 
that  purpose.  These included the Midland (11)  Chemical Company, which 
manufactured chloroform  and  carbon  tetrachloride,  and  the  Merck  Com- 
 pan^.^' The Dow Company would itself use chlorine to produce a wide range 
of products over the next ten years. The accounting system at Dow treated the 
income from these various sales of power and chlorine as credits to the cost of 
producing bleach.  No attempt was made to determine the cost incurred or 
profit earned on these transactions. While this allowed the firm to avoid the 
inherent arbitrariness involved in the allocation of joint costs, it also made it 
more difficult to evaluate the profitability of new products as they were intro- 
duced. 
The Haskins and  Sells  1905 report recommended creating separate ac- 
counts to credit receipts for sale of chlorine, electricity, water, and so forth, 
rather than simply crediting them to the cost of bleach. 
Certain accounts affecting the cost of  product were found to be credited 
with the amount received for sale of electric current and other services. The 
materials and supplies inventory accounts were also found credited with the 
selling price of materials sold at a profit. These accounts were adjusted to 
eliminate the credit representing such element of  profit, and the amounts 
for sale of electric current and water service from the operating plant are 
stated in Exhibit “B” as sales. (20 June  1905, p.  4, file 050061x,  Dow 
Papers) 
When this change was made,  it led to problems in  interpreting the cost of 
bleach figures that were produced later, as, absent these credits, bleach ap- 
peared more expensi~e.~~  The total profits earned by the company in the joint 
production of bleach and power were, of course, unchanged. 
Haskins and Sells also recommended creating separate accounts to which 
56.20  June 1905, file 050061x, Dow Papers. 
57. The Midland (11) Chemical Company was formed in  1902 by Herbert Dow, A. W.  Smith, 
and W.  0.  Quayle. After several years of less than successful operation, its entire facilities were 
leased to the Dow Chemical Company in  1908. The Midland (11) Company was purchased by the 
Dow Company in 1914. 
58. See letters from H. H. Dow to A. E. Convers, 31 October 1905, file 050012~;  C. A. Post 
to H. H. Dow, 1 November 1905, file050021x; H. H. Dow to C. A. Post, 3 November 1905Jile 
050021~;  C. A. Post to H. H. Dow, 6 November 1905, file 050021~;  and H. H. Dow to C. A. 
Post, 14 November 1905, file 050021x, Dow Papers. 106  Margaret Levenstein 
to charge the cost of producing water and power sold to the city, and so forth, 
so that  an estimate  of the profit on these transactions could be made: “It is 
suggested that the maintenance of properties not employed in manufacturing 
be charged to separate maintenance accounts from those applicable to cost of 
production,  so that  the cost  of  maintaining  such  properties  can be  applied 
against the rental received therefrom” (20 June 1905, p. 5,  file 050061x, Dow 
Papers). While this change led to confusion and difficulty in the short run, it 
highlighted the increasing profits that the firm was earning from chlorine con- 
sumed in other forms besides bleach. 
Bennett’s initial response  to this  proposal to set up separate accounts for 
each product varied depending on the importance of the product in the overall 
strategy of the Dow Chemical Company. 
I believe our method of handling the credit of sales with possibly the excep- 
tion  of  the  sales of Chlorin  gas while  probably  not correct from a strict 
accounting  standpoint  has been  correct  inasmuch  as the business is con- 
ducted only for the manufacture of Bleaching Powder and Bromides,  and 
these credits have only been used to obtain the correct cost of  Bleaching 
Powder and Bromides, and the profit contained in these credits is small in 
comparison to the total amount. (Letter from E. W.  Bennett to H. E. Hack- 
enberg, 11 July 1905, file 050061x, Dow Papers) 
Despite Bennett’s reservations, the existing records indicate that the company 
did decide to treat all items sold symmetrically,  showing a separate profit for 
each item  (fig.  3.12). The problem  of allocating joint costs was not easily 
solved, however.  Herbert Dow wrote to A. E. Convers, H. E. Hackenberg, 
and C. A. Post explaining the new method of computation of costs, and the 
difficulties arising therefrom. 
So far we have been unable to find a satisfactory system for separating the 
cost of chlorine  sold  Mr. Quayle  and electric light sold the city. On this 
account, the cost was charged in with the Bleaching Powder, and the total 
receipts from Chlorine and electricity therefore stand, at the present time, 
entirely as profit.  This system, of  course, is just as bad as the old one, in 
which the profits stood as a credit to expense, but it is now in such shape 
that by another month we can probably show it as an independent item of 
profit. (31 October 1905, file 050012x, Dow Papers) 
The problem was solved for the time being, but arose repeatedly as new prod- 
ucts were added.59  These difficulties were exacerbated when the company in- 
59. Three years later Herbert Dow was still writing to Cleveland to explain the difficulties in 
What has brought this matter up is a more or less exhaustive investigation of last month’s run 
of the benzoate plant. In carrying this work out we find there is no one here who has a sufficient 
combination of  chemical and book-keeping knowledge to be sure that the results obtained rep- 
resent the actual conditions, (and if  we wished to he extremely particular, we might say that 
strictly accurate accounting in this case is an absolute impossibility).  In the benzoate plant there 
are a number of  steps in the process and these steps are not so clear cut and well defined that 
dividing up joint costs among the increasing number of  products. 108  Margaret Levenstein 
troduced  a new electrolytic  cell in  1913 that jointly  produced chlorine  and 
caustic  soda.60 They  were  apparently outweighed  by  the  information  made 
available for an increasing number of products. The importance of this deci- 
sion to calculate separately the cost of chlorine and other chlorine products is 
highlighted by the company’s decision, in 1913, to withdraw from the bleach 
business and use all of its chlorine output to make higher-value products.6’ 
Further changes in the costing system were made in  1909. The content of 
the changes in  1909 is not as clear from the record, but the purpose is. To a 
meeting of plant management on 30 July 1909, “Bennett stated briefly reasons 
for the change in system being necessary, principally because of the sale of a 
more extended line of products,  which line is growing.  The old system was 
not satisfactorily adaptable to even the present business, whereas present sys- 
tem  has  already  shown our  old idea  as to cost of  chlorine  wrong.  Present 
system is adaptable to increased line of manufacture” (Minutes Book of daily 
plant meetings). 
Simultaneous with these changes a new set of  monthly  reports was intro- 
duced that highlighted the net earnings and price-cost  margin (the difference 
between “Av. Price Received” and measures of “Average Cost”) of each prod- 
uct (fig. 3.13). These reports were discussed at monthly meetings of the board 
of directors and were used to evaluate the success of both new and old product 
lines. The use of price-cost  margins and net  income, compared only  infor- 
mally to expected incremental investment, to inform long-term planning cap- 
ital allocation decisions, continued throughout the period under study. 
3.6  Conclusion 
From 1892 to 1898 the Midland Chemical Company kept a very sparse set 
of  records that did not much resemble standard accounting practice. The fi- 
they can be isolated one from the other without introducing complications that would not seem 
advisable. 
For example, Plant E is shut down. The benzoate plant derives steam from Plant E, as does 
one water works.  During the time that Plant E is shut down nearly a full crew of firemen is 
employed and a big boiler and more or less big pipe kept hot with attendant losses. If  it were 
not for the benzoate plant we would probably shut down plant E and get our water supply 
entirely from the other station. We are not sure of this fact, however, as the forcing of the pumps 
at the other station might not be satisfactory in every respect. During frosty weather it would be 
necessary to keep a boiler in Plant E running. Under these circumstances should the benzoate 
plant be charged an extra price for steam during the time that Plant E is not running? 
If so, the rule would apply in  a number of  other cases and some of  them are much more 
involved and complicated than this case. (H. H. Dow to H. E. Hackenberg, 31 August 1908, 
file 080015x, Dow Papers) 
This suggests that, contrary to traditional accounting history, and similarly to Johnson and Kap- 
Ian’s (1987) argument, firms in this period had a clearer notion of avoidable and incremental costs 
than did the accountants of the day. 
60. Chlorine-caustic cells, though of  a different design, had been in use at Niagara Falls since 
1897 (Trescott 1981). 
61, They continued to produce bleach for several years, however, selling to their established 
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Fig. 3.13  Monthly product report, Dow Chemical Company, 1910-13? 
nancial reports of the company were produced annually, or sometimes semian- 
nually, but certainly not with enough frequency to be used as aids in manage- 
ment. That the irregular arrangement of these accounts prevented them from 
being used even as an aid to potential stockholders is indicated by Hacken- 
berg’s having them rewritten prior to an increase in capitalization and subse- 
quent merger with the Dow Chemical Company. 
I presume that I now have all the bills and books, etc. of the Company from 
its organization, and while I have not had time to more than casually look 110  Margaret Levenstein 
through the books, a system of  accounts has evidently been employed at 
variance with anything in my experience of fifteen years, and I think it quite 
important to get the expert at work to write up a new  set from the begin- 
ning, as soon as possible, especially in view of our intention to increase the 
Capital Stock to $300,000.00. (Letter from H. E.  Hackenberg to H. S. 
Cooper, 18 January 1899, file 990047x, Dow Papers) 
With Hackenberg’s arrival in 1898, the accounts were kept with greater care 
and in a fashion comprehensible to others. Perhaps more importantly for our 
purposes, he instituted the production of monthly financial reports. This prac- 
tice was adopted at the Dow Chemical Company when he became its secretary 
in 1900. These reports were used both by Herbert Dow and the board of direc- 
tors to monitor effort by plant management. 
Meanwhile, Herbert Dow,  first at the Dow Process Company and then at 
the Dow  Chemical Company, was  experimenting with the use of  reporting 
procedures such as daily job cards and weekly reports on factory efficiency, 
measured both  in terms of  physical consumption of  inputs and their dollar 
cost. The former provided  information that  was  used to monitor employee 
effort and make short-term planning decisions regarding plant operations. 
After the merger of the Dow and Midland Chemical companies, the infor- 
mation  system continued to be  adapted to provide very  frequent technical 
measures of quality and production efficiency, for use in monitoring processes 
and short-term planning, somewhat less frequent monetary measures, primar- 
ily used to monitor people for effort, and measures, even less frequent but still 
quite regular, of net profit on an increasing number of products, used some- 
what informally to make long-term planning decisions. 
While many factors influenced the firm’s decisions regarding the collection 
and calculation of cost data, including the recommendations of professional 
auditors, the most important determinants were changes in firm strategy and 
the organization of the markets in which the firms’ products were distributed. 
The firm’s accounting records evolved during this period from a fairly haphaz- 
ard affair, used rarely in the management of the firm, to a complex system that 
produced daily, weekly, and monthly reports used actively by both plant man- 
agement and the board of directors to monitor plant managers and make long- 
term capital allocation decisions. As the firm evolved from one that produced 
only one product and sold it in cartelized market to one that produced many 
joint products sold in increasingly competitive markets, the demands on the 
information system changed. The modifications of the information system in- 
stituted by management seem to have responded well, if not always smoothly, 
to these new demands. Some of these modifications reflect movement toward 
modem standard accounting procedures, and some are quite distinct. 111  The Use of Cost Measures 
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Comment  B~Y  Supple 
Margaret  Levenstein’s paper  raises  a  number  of  issues  the  importance  of 
which is relevant to both company biography (in this case the early history of 
Dow Chemical) and more general themes (notably the symbiotic relation be- 
tween accounting systems and management control on the one hand and mar- 
kets and management strategies on the other). 
The presentation of my comments on her paper may be helped if it is intro- 
duced by my own summary of what I take to be  its highlights-which,  at the 
least, will expose the degree to which I have grasped, or (it may well be) 
misunderstood, Levenstein’s argument. 
The core of the paper is the contrast between two types of information sys- 
tems, although occasionally the phrase has a rather grandiose ring, dealing as 
we  are with  a  fairly  primitive  institution,  rather  threadbare  archives,  and 
sketchy pieces of paper. 
In any event, the “systems” under discussion are identified with two firms, 
whose histories were closely interwoven and ultimately identified by merger. 
The original  firm, the Midland Chemical Company, founded in  1892, is 
seen by Levenstein as a noninnovative enterprise, dominated by  the aspira- 
tions of its nontechnical owners, who restricted the activities and ambitions of 
its striving and ambitious founder, Herbert Dow.  The firm’s investors were 
apparently content with a “mercantile” system of  accounts, that is, broad re- 
ports by the general manager on his cash situation and the overall cash flow of 
the firm. By the same token, there was little systematized information avail- 
able that would have been relevant to the monitoring of plant management and 
performance (product costs and quality, efficiency, and profitability). 
In the paper these lackadaisical procedures are related to the participation 
of Midland in a cartel (where sales were assured but limited) and to the result- 
ing absence of any very strong incentive to control costs. This seems persua- 
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sive as far as it goes, although it seems to me  that it would also have been 
helpful if the paper had provided some critical appraisal of the implications of 
the scale of operations involved; after all, a Mickey Mouse business may not 
need any very elaborate communication networks, and in these years Midland 
was hardly a giant among enterprises. But, whatever the relevance of  grandi- 
ose concepts, the board’s attitude and constraints ultimately led to the resig- 
nation of the founder, Dow. 
Second, and by way of contrast, Levenstein discusses the case of the Dow 
Chemical Company (founded by  Dow after he left Midland). Dow Chemical, 
she argues, provided a different context for information systems, since it first 
of all pursued a much more vigorous policy of product and process innovation 
and diversification, and subsequently exemplified a more aggressive attitude 
to market expansion and competition. 
Although the direction of  the functional relationship is not always clear, 
these strategies were associated with the gradual extension of Dow’s system 
of  information flows. This involved the use of daily time cards to keep track 
of  labor (and then to analyze costs over time) and the compilation of  weekly 
reports enumerating the cost of  different plant activities and measuring tech- 
nical efficiency and product quality. 
Meanwhile, in  1898 Herbert Dow had gained control of Midland, which 
(not surprisingly) adopted the practice of  weekly financial and technical re- 
ports. Further, Midland’s treasurer, H. E. Hackenberg, introduced a system 
of monthly financial reports. 
In  1900 the two  firms merged,  with  Hackenberg as secretary. Now  the 
monthly reports he had devised at Midland were adopted at the new corpora- 
tion, and reporting systems were amalgamated and developed, being used pri- 
marily to monitor plant activity. 
At  this point we encounter the other stem of  Levenstein’s argument: the 
adducing of statistical information was extended from the sphere of financial 
reporting for the benefit of shareholders interested primarily in final perform- 
ance. Now  it was also adapted to the management and plant needs of a multi- 
product firm-including  the need  to  measure  the  profitability  of  different 
products, albeit not with the regularity and overriding investment implications 
to which Chandler has drawn our attention. 
At the same time, however, Levenstein makes the point that much of  the 
financialkost reporting was  still for the benefit of  the board of  directors, 
whereas more “technical” reporting (that is, reports on physical efficiency, 
throughput, and quality) evolved as a tool for (plant) management-a  logical 
and perhaps necessary step at a time when quality control was becoming more 
important competitively. She quotes Dow himself on the superiority of “fac- 
tory efficiency methods” over financial bookkeeping, and points to the secrecy 
surrounding unit cost data (with intermediate management being denied ac- 
cess to it)-both  points that seem to bear out Thomas Johnson’s thesis (in 
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In  practice, however (and again exemplifying some of  Johnson’s general 
themes), problems and pitfalls emerged because of the conceptual and practi- 
cal difficulties of  allocating joint  costs between different products, and re- 
ceipts between different accounts. Levenstein makes the point that until 1905 
internal accounting was confused in its treatment of the firm’s multiple prod- 
ucts, and she illustrates this at two levels. 
First, the division of costs between bleach and bromides was a function of 
the historical organization of  the company (with the result that the cost of 
producing some products and the pattern of  costs as a whole were unknown 
or neglected). Second, when the firm diversified into the production and sale 
of electricity, water, and chlorine, income was credited to the cost of produc- 
ing bleach, and “no attempt was made to determine the cost incurred or profit 
earned on these transactions.” Consequently, the firm found it difficult to eval- 
uate the profitability of new products. 
I have gone into this point at length, because it seems to me to need more 
explication in terms of the main themes of  the paper. Given that these proce- 
dures seem to reflect inadequate information systems, how  does that square 
with the paper’s other implied argument, that Dow Chemical’s systems ex- 
emplified a sensitive response to the pressures of a multiproduct firm operat- 
ing in a more competitive market? What, in the end, determines the quality of 
the information system adopted? Is there scope for innovation in such a sys- 
tem, and would we expect competition to produce the best possible system at 
any one time? 
These questions are the more pertinent in view of the fact that from 1905 
on, as a result of the auditors’ report, receipts from the sale of the new prod- 
ucts (chlorine, electricity, water) were credited to separate accounts, rather 
than to the cost of the bleach with which their production had been associated. 
Curiously, however, Levenstein makes the point that “this change . . . led to 
problems in interpreting the cost of  bleach figures that were produced later,” 
since they made it seem more expensive. Yet,  on the surface, the procedure 
seems more rational and managerially helpful than the preceding system: al- 
locating incomes and (because of  an associated recommendation) costs more 
nearly where they originated. For in this way the profitability of different op- 
erations was more easily measured, although the “jointness” of  production 
means that conceptual precision could not be perfect. 
In any event, it would have been helpful to have been  told  a little more 
about these innovations in information systems-or,  since the records are ob- 
viously imperfect, to have been provided with a more extensive discussion of 
possibilities. 
What might have been the respective role of  accountants and managers? 
How much of a handicap was the confusing of accounts and products when it 
came to attributing costs and incomes? How far is the intervention of the au- 
ditors (which appears to have achieved an  improvement in  accounting and 
information) consistent with Johnson’s theory that the objectives and direc- 115  The Use of Cost Measures 
tives of  auditors did not always produce the best information basis for man- 
agement? 
In many respects Levenstein’s conclusions (implicit and explicit) seem in- 
escapable: subtle physical measures are obviously more useful devices than 
cash  flow  data  for assessing the performance of  different production pro- 
cesses; a firm that does not need (or does not think it needs) to worry about 
competition and has a generous profit margin will be that much less concerned 
with close monitoring of  its technical efficiency and product costs; multiple 
products and/or competitive markets and/or an ambition to expand aggres- 
sively will (like hanging) concentrate a man’s mind wonderfully; accurate cost 
accounting is better management practice than imperfect cost accounting; a 
knowledge of the structure of costs and the performance of productive agents 
is a better basis for business enterprise than a simple knowledge of a single 
financial outcome for a multiplicity of activities; and the needs and concepts 
of auditors and accounts concerned with final outcomes are not necessarily the 
same as those of managers, although on this last point I sense some confusion 
in that in this instance the professionals’ intervention appears to have been a 
step toward better and more relevant information. 
Leaving this last point aside, however, what is still not entirely clear from 
the material in Levenstein’s paper is the extent to which accounting and infor- 
mation flows were “functional” in the sense of  arising more or less directly 
and inescapably from the managerial needs of the business. Obviously, they 
were not purely so; first, because some of them appear to have been imposed 
by  accountants whose perspective was different from that of managers; sec- 
ond, because innovation and diffusion depended on the outlook and abilities 
of  individual managers; and third, because it is inconceivable that at any one 
point in time the content and flow of  management information are as perfect 
as they might be-that  is, it is obviously possible to envisage an as yet undev- 
ised or unapplied improvement, in which case business could perform at a 
level superior to the current one, and information (or any other) systems that 
might be generated by current “needs” are not being so produced. 
And yet, this paper does on the whole give the impression that what hap- 
pened was predetermined-the  product of need-in  the sense that there was 
a close fit between information and the market situation and strategy that it 
served. 
I appreciate that this is a little unfair to Levenstein in that she does not claim 
that Midland performed optimally with the data it generated (i.e., it is pos- 
sible to envisage a more efficient and profitable use of resources facilitated by 
better information, so that the spatchcock system used imposed its own ob- 
vious handicaps in terms of opportunities forgone). 
Nevertheless, the tone of  the argument is set by  Levenstein’s somewhat 
strained references to the relationship between changes in  markets and firm 
strategy, shifts in the demand for information, and the evolution of informa- 
tion systems, and by  her claim that,  in  modifying the information system, 116  Margaret Levenstein 
management responded well to the new  demands of the competitive sale of 
joint products. 
The potential vulnerability of  the general argument is exposed by  the pa- 
per’s conclusion, which does little more than highlight the principal narrative 
facts and associate them with some not particularly subtle concepts (distinc- 
tions between information used  to monitor employee effort, to make short- 
term  planning decisions,  to  monitor  processes,  etc.) and  some  analytical 
generalizations about the presumed role of strategy and markets in shaping 
information systems. The trouble, of course, is that we are here dealing with 
such a simple level of business organization and such a restrained degree of 
development that there seems to be a disconcerting contrast between the sim- 
plicity of the material and the apparent sophistication of the analysis. 
Part of  the problem is that so many of the potentially broader implications 
of the argument are left to be deduced by  each reader from the paper itself. 
Indeed, it is precisely because there is so little apparent assessment of how far 
these events were representative, or of  what might have been alternatives to 
them, that what happened at Midland and Dow Chemical have the air of func- 
tional inevitability. 
And yet economists as well as historians should resist this conclusion. In 
saying this I do not mean to regress to the banalities of old-fashioned business 
history, seeking explanations and rationale in the unpredictability of individ- 
ual effort and heroic enterprise. But the essence of the problem can be sum- 
marized in a number of questions that are only partially dealt with in Leven- 
stein’s paper: How  far is organizational innovation a logical (and apparently 
inevitable) outcome of  business needs? Why are  information systems im- 
proved? In what sense are they “needed” at particular points in time? Why are 
they not “improved” even more at particular points in time? 
Nor do I think that we should be too preoccupied with modernity. Reading 
about Dow’s enthusiasm for “factory efficiency methods,” I was reminded of 
the Boulton and Watt engine manufactory, one hundred years before, where 
processes were subdivided and measured, where machine speeds were studied 
and costed, where the average time and expense involved in making each part 
were calculated. In the evolution of  information systems, as in so much of 
human activity, progress is not linear. More than this, when dealing with exi- 
guous material, commonsense is often a better guide than excessively grand 
conceptualizations. 